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Louisiana court and the Indiana court cited this annotation as authority for the
fact that a majority of states denied recovery on these bonds.
The result of the principal case is certainly harsh upon the individual who
is injured. It is well settled that the city is not liable for the torts of its
policemen. 20 This leaves the individual a cause of action against the policeman
personally as his only recourse. H. S. C.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PAROL MODIFICATION-LEASES UNDER THE STATUTE.-
Appellee herein declared upon a written contract by the terms of which the
appellee was to install, repair, and maintain an electric sign, and the appellant
was to keep and use the sign for a period of thirty-six months and to pay the
sum of twenty-one dollars and seventy cents per month, monthly in advance
during the life of the agreement. The agreement further provided for an
additional period of thirty-six months, at a price designated in the contract,
unless at least thirty days before the expiration of the original term of the
contract either party gave written notice to have the agreement terminated.
The complaint alleged a breach of the contract after four monthly payments
and asked judgment for a sum equal to an amount agreed upon by the parties
in the contract to represent their actual loss in event of a breach. The lower
court excluded evidence of parol modification of the contract, also a letter of
compromise which had never been accepted. Held, the evidence was properly
excluded. 1
The principal case raises an interesting question involving the Statute of
Frauds. The provision of the statute applicable to the case is: "No action
shall be brought in any of the following cases, * * 0 Upon any agreement
that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof. Unless the
promise, contract, or agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or
some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the
party to be charged therewith, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully
authorized, excepting however leases not exceeding the term of three yars."2
This provision of the statute has been generally construd to man that if a
contract cannot be performed within one year, it is within the statute and
therefore must be in writing.3 It is clear that in the principal case the contract
was incapable of being performed within one year. As to the admissibility
of evidence to show a parol modification of the written agreement, the
authorities agree that where the statute of frauds requires a contract to be in
writing, it cannot be modified, changed, or varied in its terms or provisions
by a parol contract or agreement. 4 The parol evidence introduced for the
20 City of Lafayette v. Timberlake (1882), 88 Ind. 330; Town of Laurel
v. Blue (1890), 1 Ind. App. 128, 27 N. E. 301, Vaughtman v. Town of
Waterloo (1895), 14 Ind. App. 649, 43 N. E. 467, Mayne v. Curtis (1920),
73 Ind. App. 640, 126 N. E. 699. See also Eugene McQuillin, Law of Municipal
Corporations (2d Ed. 1928), Sec. 2837, Vol. 6, p. 873.
1 Maglaris v. Claude Neon Federal Co. (1935), - Ind. -, 198 N. E. 462.
2 Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat. (1933), Sec. 33-101.
3 Groves v. Cook (1882), 88 Ind. 169, 45 Am. Rep. 462; Shumate v.
Farlow (1890), 125 Ind. 359, 25 N. E. 432; Meyer v. E. G. Spink Co. (1921),
76 Ind. App. 318, 124 N. E. 757, 127 N. E. 455, Page, Contracts, vol. 2, 2247-8,
Sec. 1300; Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 198.
4 Bradley v. Hunter (1901), 156 Ind. 499, 60 N. E. 139; Carpenter v.
Calloway (1881), 73 Ind. 418, Christian v. Highlands (1903), 32 Ind. App.
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purpose of showing a modification of the contract was, therefore, properly
excluded.
A rather interesting question is raised by a dictum of the court that,
"Even if the contract were to be considered a lease, it would be required to
be in writing as it creates a term of more than three years."
The first question that arises is as to whether there is actually a term in
excess of three years. The agreement of the parties states that the period is
for three years, but provision is made for an additional period unless notice
of termination is given by either party. The general rule seems to be that
where there is an option in the lease to renew, the lease is within the statute
of frauds if the sum of the original term and the renewal period is more
than the period provided in the statute.5 The authorities seem to limit this
rule to the situation where there is an option to renew in the lessee. The
writer submits that there is a logical explanation for this rule because it might
be said that there is in the lessee a right to a term equal to the sum of the
original term and the renewal period. The circumstances are slightly different
in the principal case where there is an automatic renewal unless either party
exercises a power to disaffirm. The fact that where there is an option to
renew, the two periods are added to determine the duration of the lease,
might seem to show that a fortiari they should be added where the renewal is
automatic. On the other hand it is true that in the principal case there- was
no right in the lessee for a term equal to the sum of the two periods because
either party had a power of disaffirmance. The reasoning which upholds
adding the original term and the renewal period, to determine the term of a
lease where there is an option in the lessee to have a renewal, does not justify
using the same formula where neither party may be said to have a right to the
renewal, as either party has a power to disaffirm. There is a line of authority
in the English cases to the effect that if the renewal depends on whether or
not it is agreeable to both parties, then the period of the lease is no longer
than the original term exclusive of any term of renewal.6 This rule has been
followed in Indiana.7 The court, however, does not consider the distinction,
but merely states that this was a lease of more than three years.
As it has heretofore been seen, the clause of the statute referring to contracts
not to be performed within one year has been construed to mean contracts
which cannot be performed within one year.8 Furthermore, it has been held
104. 69 N. E. 266, Napier Iron Works v. Caldwell and Drake Iron Works
(1915), 60 Ind. App. 317, 110 N. E. 714, Nadgeman v. Cawley (1928), 89
Ind. App. 196, 162 N. E. 68.
Schmitz v. Lauferty (1868), 29 Ind. 400; Williams v. Mershon (1894),
57 N. J. L. 242, 30 At. 619; Rosen v. Rosen (1995), 13 Misc. 561, 73 N. Y. S.
946, Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, vol. 2, page 1518.
a Legg v. Strudwick, 2 Salk. 414, 91 Eng. Rep. 360; Roberts, On Frauds,
242. note 93, The Case of Hand v. Hall (1377), 2 Exch. Div. 318, recognizes
the necessity of a r;ght in one of the panes to a renewal before the term of
the lease may be considered the sum of the original term and the renewal
period. It says, "A lease not exceeding three years, in our opinion, must be
a lease not giving a right (independent of the lessor) exceeding three years."
7 Swan v. Clark, Guardian (1881), 80 Ind. 57, Schmitz v. Lauferty
(1868), 29 Ind. 400.
8 Groves v. Cook (1882), 88 Ind. 169, 45 Am. Rep. 462; Shumate v.
Farlow (1890), 125 Ind. 359, 25 N. E. 432; Meyer v. E. G. Spink Co. (1921),
76 Ind. App. 318, 124 N. E. 757, 127 N. E. 455; Page, On Contracts, Sec. 19-8.
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that the clause is not applicable to contracts that may or may not be performed
within one year.O Again, referring to the court's dictum regarding leases and
admitting that the lease would be one for more than three years, it would
seem by analogy that if the lease might be performed within the statutory
period, it would be outside the statute. The drawing of such an analogy would
be important in the principal case, for here the lease (if it were one) might
have been performed within the statutory period were either party to give
notice to terminate. It is true that in drawing such an analogy a result would
be reached which would be consistent with what is sometimes said to be the
trend of modern cases to nullify the operation of the statute of frauds.10 The
New York case of Ward v. Hasbrouck holds that a lease for more than the
statutory period is outside the statute if there is a possibility that the lease
might be terminated within the statutory period."1 That case, however, has
been criticized on the ground that the principles applicable to contracts not to
be performed within one year should not apply to leases, since the latter are
in the nature of conveyances rather than executory contracts. 12 The courts
of Indiana do not apply the analogy and consistently hold that these leases which
are of a term greater than that provided by the statute, but which might be
terminated before the statutory period has elapsed are within the statute of
frauds.13 O.E.B.
BAILMENTS-LIABILITY OF BAILOR FOR PERSONAL INJURIES TO BAILEE RESULTING
FROM VICIOUS PROPENSITIES OF THE BAILED ANIMAL.-In April, 1931, the
defendant company rented a team of mules and a mare to plaintiff's decedent
and his nephew. The animals were used in defendant's business and were
stabled and cared for in decedent's barn. Decedent's nephew worked the
mare and paid defendant for her use while decedent worked the mules. On
August 11, 1931, the defendant suggested that the mare be worked with one of
the mules and the parties agreed upon the exchange. Thereafter, but before
the mare had been used in the team, she kicked the decedent causing injuries
which resulted in his death. It is agreed that the relation between the
decedent and defendant is that of bailee and bailor. The complaint "is
predicated upon the alleged negligent conduct of the defendant in knowingly
9 Wiggins v. Keizer (1855), 6 Ind. 452; Wilson v. Ray (1859), 13 Ind. 1,
Hill v. Jamieson (1861), 16 Ind. 125, 79 Am. Dec. 414, Indiana & I C. R. Co.
v. Scearce (1864), 23 Ind. 223, Bell v. Hewitt (1865), 24 Ind. 280; Frost
v. Tarr (1876), 53 Ind. 290; Parker v. Siple (1881), 76 Ind. 345, Hinkle v.
Fisher (1885), 104 Ind. 84, 3 N. E. 524, Piper v. Fosher (1889), 121 Ind.
407, 23 N. E. 269; Durham v. Hiatt (1890), 127 Ind. 514, 26 N. E. 401, Decatur
v. McKean (1906), 167 Ind. 249, 78 N. E. 982; Freas v. Custer (1928), 201
Ind. 159, 166 N. E. 434, Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan (1892), 6 Ind. App. 109,
32 N. E. 802, 51 Am. St. 289; American Quarries Co. v. Lay (1905), 37 Ind.
App. 386, 75 N. E. 608, Timmonds v. Taylor (1911), 48 Ind. App. 531, 96
N. E. 331.
10Willis, Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism (1928), 3 Ind. Law
Journal 427, at page 539.
11 Ward v. Hasbrouck (1902), 169 N. Y. 407, 62 N. E. 434.
12 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, vol. 2, page 1518.
13 Schmitz v. Laoferty (1868), 29 Ind. 400. Had the lease in the principal
case been for three years to start some time in the future, the lease would
have been within the statute regardless of the question raised by the fact
that it could have been performed in three years.
